[geeks] I just saw...

[Charles Shannon Hendrix]

Wed, 08 Nov 2006 @ 06:29 -0600, Lionel Peterson said:

> >To me the solution is the same as it is in the retail space: the
> >receipts are created as duplicates, and the supercede the system.
> 
> Well, the first problem is if folks have receipts, thay can go and
> prove to another person that they voted a certain way, either in
> response to pressure or inducement. It used to happen in America, and
> it could happen again.

Why would the voter have them?

I thought the suggestion was that the machine printed a receipt showing
who you voted for, and you put that in a ballot box. In a dispute, the
paper receipts would be counted since theoretically each voter verified
they were accurate.

> >I don't really mind the idea, and I don't see what is so hard about
> >making it secure.
> 
> Either you trust electonic voting or not, and if you feel you need the
> paper audit trail, I argue you don't really trust it.

I trust systems of accounting, but I still want receipts.

I trust my computer systems, but I still generate hard copy.

I trust the ATM, but I still verify transactions.

I just my friends, but I still have important agreements written down
and signed.

Trust doesn't have to be absolute, and it can also be imposed.

> >After all, it is fairly easy to tamper with existing voting machines and
> >I imagine that card reader could be tampered with too.
> 
> Tamper with one machine (mechanical or electronic), and you can impact
> many ballots.

Tamper with the voting template for the paper ballot counting machine,
and you have the same issue.

Paper ballots have been machine counted for decades now.

I can't remember the last time I voted and the ballot was hand counted
unless there was a recount.

It's always been done by a machine which could be tampered with.

-- 
shannon "AT" widomaker.com -- ["We have nothing to prove" -- Alan Dawkins]