[geeks] [rescue] consciousness immortality [was: Sun Sparcstation 20 hard disks]

[Mouse]

>> I'm not sure what "-me- the original" actually is,
> for purposes of arg, in advance of any of this tech existing '-me-
> the original' is the one who's involved in this discussion.

That "me" will no longer exist in a month, never mind by the time we
learn how to build the sort of tech we're talking about here.

It may seem that I'm hairsplitting.  I don't think I am.  I'm
(deliberately) calling into question what it is that we mean when we
use pronouns or other conceptualizations that _ever_ consider a person
who exists at one time and a person who exists at another time to be
the same person.  "Me" is just one of the sharpest forms of this.

Yes, I think I have some idea what you're talking about; I too use such
language (one could hardly use English otherwise) and have _some_ sort
of conceptual framework to back it.  But that conceptual framework is a
relatively vague one; in particular, it is not clear to me exactly what
it is about tomorrow-me and today-me that causes me to consider them
the same person.  I can think of some plausible possibilities, but they
lead to different results when applied to the scenario under discussion
here, which is why I'm bringing them up.  (This also is part of why I
find the prosect fascinating; I _like_ mind-stretching experiences, and
ones that would help me nail down some slippery concepts I particularly
welcome.)

>> [...] the distinction you're trying to draw [...]
> for me, it hinges on whether a real transference is ever possible,
> not just copy/deletion.

My point is that, depending on how you define "the same person", and
depending on how the technology turns out to work, there may not be any
difference between copy/delete and transfer.

>>> unity is a promising concept, but -- here's a nightmare for ya:
>>> [protoplasmic portion of a fused mind dies]
>> That's no more of a nightmare to me than the prospect of a
>> purely-meat me suffering death of a part - a stroke, for example -
>> and thereby suffering a very similar loss.
> and no less of a nightmare, either.

True enough.  I don't find it very nightmarish, though.  "Does it
trouble you to contemplate the years before your birth?  Then why does
it those after your death?"  I gain skills routinely, and lose them
almost as routinely; this seems only marginally worse.

Compare with the prospect of the silicon fraction "dying" and the "me"
losing its capabilities, falling back to the original, protoplasmic,
model.  Do you find that as nightmarish?  Why or why not?

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